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LEGAL MALPRACTICE AND RULE 10b-5 LIABILITY:
PITFALLS FOR THE OCCASIONAL
SECURITIES PRACTITIONER
by Mitchell L. Lathrop* and William F. Rinehart**
At one time or another, most growing businesses require' addi-
tional capital for meeting the demands of increasing production, ex-
panding facilities, entering new markets or attending to the myriad
exigencies which arise in the day-to-day operation of any business
enterprise. Although the issuance of stock is a desirable (as well as
often the only practical) means of raising funds, the prohibitive ex-
pense of complying with the registration requirements of the Securi-
ties Act of 19331 (hereinafter "the 1933 Act") may preclude a closely
held business from going public with a large interstate offering of
securities. Further, the continuing financial and disclosure burdens
imposed upon public companies by the Securities Exchange Act of
19342 (hereinafter "the 1934 Act") may inhibit other businesses from
seeking public capital through the issuance of securities. However,
notwithstanding these prohibitive factors, where compelling business
exigencies demand acquisition of significant amounts of capital, busi-
ness enterprises have relied and will likely continue to rely upon the
issuance of securities to meet such demand.
There are, in essence, four practical methods of obtaining financing
through the sale of securities:3 (1) a full registration under the pro-
visions of the 1933 Act;' (2) an abbreviated registration under a
Regulation A filing;' (3) a "private placement;"6 or (4) an "intra-
* B.S. 1959, United States Naval Academy; J.D. 1966, University of Southern Cali-
fornia; member of the California and District of Columbia Bars.
** B.A. 1954, LL.B. 1955, Stanford University; member of the California Bar.
1. Securities Act of 1933 § 1-26, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. H9 77a-77aa (1970).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 1-34, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. H9 78a-78hh
(1970).
3. There are, of course, alternative means of financing available, e.g., bank
financing and short-form Regulation A financing, which is limited to $50,000 (17
C.F.R. § 230.257 (1971) ). These options are not normally exercised in a situation
where a sizeable amount of capital must be raised and hence they will not here-
after be discussed.
4. See note 1 supra.
5. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1970), authorizes the
Securities and Exchange Commission to exempt any class of securities by rules and
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state offering. ' '7  Although the applicable state Blue Sky laws must be
considered in connection with financing through any of these meth-
ods,8 the private placement and the intrastate offering, at least ini-
tially, do not involve federal administrative regulation by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (hereinafter "the SEC").
While many attorneys whose aid has been enlisted in the raising of
venture capital obdurately refuse to undertake the burdens encoun-
tered in full registration of a security, they do not hesitate to raise
capital through issuance of a security or through a transaction which
they believe to be exempt from the registration requirements of the
1933 Act. The literal language of the private placement and intra-
state offering exemptions would suggest that the federal securities laws
provide liberal methods of acquiring capital without the burdens of
full registration. However, this is not the case. Unfamiliarity with
these exemptive provisions, as well as inadvertent or purposeful mis-
use of the Regulation A offering procedure, may breed chaos and fi-
nancial disaster for the corporate client as well as its shareholders.
Moreover, this unfamiliarity and misuse may portend financial ruin for
the attorney as well. It is the purpose of this article to suggest and
illustrate, through the use of a hypothetical situation, the potential
legal malpractice and Rule 10b-59 liability of the attorney incognizant
of the pitfalls involved in an attempt to acquire capital through a law-
ful but unregistered issuance of securities.
ALTERNATIVES TO REGISTRATION UNDER THE 1933 ACT
The guiding principle of the 1933 Act is reposed in Section 5,10
which requires the registration of all securities offered or sold through
regulations, provided the aggregate amount offered does not exceed $500,000. Pursu-
ant to this authority, the Commission promulgated Regulation A. SEC Reg. A, 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.251-230.263 (1971). The usefulness of this regulation was enhanced by
amendments to Section 3(b) and Regulation A which increased the maximum amount
allowable from $300,000 to $500,000. Act of Dec. 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-565,
84 Stat. 1480, amending 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1970).
6. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970). See text accom-
panying notes 21-38 infra.
7. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1970). See text
accompanying notes 39-49 infra.
8. For an excellent synopsis of the bewildering variety of state regulatory approaches
to securities offerings, see W. CARY, CAsEs AND MATER4ms ON CoRaoasAoNs 1477-83
(4th ed. 1969); Ptacek, Blue Sky Considerations in Structuring a Public Offering, 21
DRAKE L. Rnv. 225 (1972).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
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the use of interstate commerce or the mails, unless the securities are
themselves exempt or are offered or sold in an exempted transaction.".
The registration of securities, unfortunately, is a process which is expen-
sive, time-consuming, and, in many cases, far too elaborate to be of
significant advantage to a small business. 2 Although most, if not
all, practitioners familiar with federal securities law would concur
that full registration is the safest course for an issuer to follow, as a
practical matter, the advice given most issuers deals with the season-
able employment of one of the Act's exemptive provisions. This ad-
vice should be cautiously proffered since an issuer who improperly re-
lies upon an exemption, and thereby fails to comply with Section 5,
is civilly liable under Section 12 of the 1933 Act.'8 Moreover, the
ambit of exemptions from Section 5 registration is strictly construed,1 4
and the claimant seeking to rely upon an exemption has the burden
of proving its availability.15
There are seventeen exemptive provisions contained in Sections 3
and 4 of the 1933 Act. Several of these provisions deal with the
particular exemption of securities; others exempt certain transactions
from the registration requirements of the Act.' 6 Of these seventeen
provisions, only three are generally encountered by the average prac-
titioner. The private placement and the intrastate offering exemptions
11. Section 3 of the 1933 Act exempts certain securities. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1970).
Section 4 of the 1933 Act exempts certain transactions. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1970).
12. For the difficulties to be encountered in a full registration, see Wheat & Black-
stone, Guideposts for a First Public Offering, 15 Bus. LAw. 539 (1960). In 1968, Mr.
Blackstone estimated the registration expenses for a $3,000,000 offering to be between
$60,000 and $100,000. See Blackstone, Post-Effective Amendment to "Guideposts for a
First Public Offering", in SELECTED ARTICLES ON FEDERAL SECURrrIES LAw 27 (H.
Wander & W. Grienenberger eds. 1968).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970). The section provides in part:
Any person who-
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section [5] ...
shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him ....
14. Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 689 (5th Cir.
1971). The Hill York court stated: "The Act is remedial legislation entitled to a
broad construction. Conversely, its exemptions must be narrowly viewed." See
also SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1938).
15. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953). The Court in Ralston
stated: "Keeping in mind the broadly remedial purposes of federal securities legislation,
imposition of the burden of proof on an issuer who would plead the exemption
[§ 4(2) of the 1933 Act] seems to us fair and reasonable." The federal courts have
uniformly followed this statement. See, e.g., SEC v. North Am. R. & D. Corp., 424
F.2d 63, 71 (2d Cir. 1970); Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153, 159 (6th Cir. 1969);
Pennaluna & Co., Inc. v. SEC, 410 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1969).
16. See note 11 supra.
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are the most important of these from the standpoint of both popularity
and misuse. However, the Regulation A offering is also encountered
with sufficient frequency as to merit comment.
Regulation A was promulgated by the SEC"' in response to the
legislative power granted by Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act. 8 It is not
a true exemption since a filing, albeit an abbreviated one, is required
by the SEC. Securities issued pursuant to a Regulation A filing must
not aggregate more than $500,000 and may not consist of either -un-
divided interests in mineral rights or investment company securities
which require registration.19 The utility of a Regulation A offering is
limited, however, in two major respects. First, the exemption must
be earned by compliance with all of the detailed provisions of Regu-
lation A. This thicket of technicalities can be almost as cumbersome
as a full registration. Second, the game may not be worth the candle
since the underwriting commissions as well as the fees of the lawyers and
accountants constitute part of the sum which cannot exceed $500,000.20
The private placement is a highly desirable transactional exemp-
tion from -the standpoint of the new business entity seeking to raise
capital by selling securities to a select group of investors. Created by
Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act,2" the provision exempts from registra-
tion private offerings in which there is no practical need for the pub-
lic protection afforded by Section 5. The critical language of the Sec-
tion 4(2) exemption, "'a transaction not involving a public offering",
necessarily implies that the offering must be "private." The factors
determinative of whether an offering qualifies for exemption as a
private placement include: the monetary amount and size of the of-
fering,22 the number of prospective investors,2 3 the purpose for which
17. 17 C.F.R. § 252(b)(1)-(2) (1972).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1970).
19. 17 C.F.R. § 252(b)(1)-(2) (1972). See also Burge, Regulation A: A Revietv
and a Look at Recent Developments, 46 L.A. BAR BULL. 290 (1971).
20. 17 C.F.R. § 252(b)(1)-(2) (1972).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).
22. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
23. Id. See Op. Gen. Counsel, Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935).
This opinion suggested as a guideline that "under ordinary circumstances an offering to
not more than approximately twenty-five persons is not an offering to a substantial
number and presumably does not involve a public offering." While the determinative
test for a public offering is qualitative and not quantitative (see SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953)), few lawyers would exceed the arbitrary twenty-five
person limit without strong justifying factors. Note also that it is offerees rather than
purchasers who are counted. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
Additionally, it should be remembered that although California presumes an offer-
ing to be nonpublic if made to twenty-five persons or less (the presumption is con-
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those investors are purchasing (investment versus speculative resale),24
and the amount of information about the transaction available to the
offerees, the purchasers, or both.25  Further, the existence of a prior
relationship between the offeror and offeree26 and the institutional or
non-institutional character of the prospective investors2 7 are relevant
though non-determinative considerations evidencing the public or non-
public character of the offering.
In its landmark decision in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,28 the United
States Supreme Court concluded that the "applicability of [the private
placement exemption] should turn on whether the particular class of
persons affected needs the protection of the Act."" In that opinion,
the Court, in effect, adopted a two-pronged test to determine whether
the particular class of persons affected in fact needed such protection.
First, the Court inquired whether the offerees had "access to the
same kind of information that the Act would make available in the
form of a registration statement. '30  In Ralston Purina, this inquiry
was answered in the negative.3 1 Earlier in the opinion, however, the
Court implied that whenever the answer to this first inquiry was in the
affirmative, a second interrogatory must follow, namely, whether the
clusive if the sale is consummated with ten or fewer individuals), compliance with
state regulatory provisions in no way guarantees that one has not violated federal
securities law. 10 CAL. AD. CoDE § 260.102(2).
24. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
25. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
26. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962). See also Mulford, Pri-
vate Placements and Intrastate Offerings of Securities, 13 Bus. LAW. 297, 300-01 (1958).
27. The House report on the 1954 amendments referred to the private placement
exemption as an avenue for "the making of an offering to a limited number of persons
who presumably may be expected to possess some familiarity with the business in-
volved." H.R. REP. No. 1542, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 19 (1954). But see Hill York
Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971) wherein the
court states:
The defendants rely most strongly on the fact that the offering was made only
to sophisticated businessmen and lawyers and not the average man in the street.
Although this evidence is certainly favorable to the defendants, the level of sophis-
tication will not carry the point. . .. [Tihe S.E.C. has rejected the position ...
stating: "The Supreme Court's language does not support the view that the
availability of an exemption depends on the sophistication of the offerees or buy-
ers, rather than their possession of, or access to, information regarding the issuer.
Id. at 690, quoting 1 L. Loss, SEcuar REGULATION 657 n.53 (2d ed. 1961).
Accord, Gilligan, Will & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5689 (1958),
aff'd sub nom., Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 896 (1959).
28. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
29. Id. at 125 (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 125-26.
31. Id. at 127.
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offerees were shown to be "persons able to fend for themselves."82
Thus, the Ralston Purina opinion suggests that when investors with the
"ability to fend for themselves" are given "access to the kinds of informa-
tion that the Act would make available in the form of a registration
statement' the offering qualifies for a Section 4(2) exemption as a
"transaction not involving a public offering."
Despite this seemingly clear and justifiable implication from the
Ralston Purina opinion, issuers and counsel would be ill-advised to
construe that case as allowing them to engineer Section 4(2) exemp-
tions by "spoon feeding" offerees the requisite information about the
issuer.3" Although such a construction might satisfy even the most
narrow interpretation of the term "access", 34 it completely ignores the
requirement that the offerees be "persons with the ability to fend for
themselves." The Supreme Court never precisely defined the meaning
of the terms "access" and "persons with the ability to fend" as used in
the Ralston Purina opinion and the SEC has continually taken and
urged the courts to take a restrictive view of the meaning of those
terms.35  The SEC has argued that a "person with the ability to fend"
is a person with a "relationship to the company tantamount to that of
an 'insider' in terms of his ability to know, to understand and to verify
for himself all of the relevant facts about the company and its securi-
ties."36  Thus, given the SEC's declared opposition to "spoon feeding '8
7
32. Id. at 125.
33. The SEC has expressly taken the position that:
The exemption does not become available simply because offerees are volun-
tarily furnished information about the issuer. Such a construction would give
each issuer the choice of registering or making its own voluntary disclosures
without regard to the standards and sanctions of the Act. SEC Securities Act
Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
34. The recent Fifth Circuit decision in Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Fran-
chises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971), suggests that access in the sense of the
mere ability to acquire the requisite information might not be sufficient to qualify the
transaction for exemption as a private placement. In a somewhat ambiguous
opinion, the Hill York court intimated that section 4(2) might not be deemed ap-
plicable unless the offerees have actual possession of the requisite information. The
court implied that without such actual possession the offerees would not be deemed to
be sophisticated investors acquiring securities in a nonpublic offering. Id. at 690-91.
35. See, e.g., Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 690-91
(5th Cir. 1971); SEC Brief on Appeal, SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co. of South
Carolina, Inc., 127 SEC REG. & L. RtP. A-17 (Mar. 22, 1972); SEC Securities Act
Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
36. SEC Brief on Appeal, SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co. of South Carolina, Inc.,
127 SEc. REG. & L. RaP. A-17 (Mar. 22, 1972). See also Hill York Corp. v. Amer-
ican Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 688 n.6 (5th Cir. 1971); Riccio, The Gen-
eral Practitioner and the Federal Securities Laws, 54 MAss. L.Q. 271, 277 (1969).
This "privileged relationship" requirement is best constructed in view of the SEC's
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and the narrow view taken of "persons with the ability to fend, ' 38 it
becomes evident that any attempted engineering of a Section 4(2)
exemption would be il-advised. The attorney and issuer who engage in
such an attempt would appear to be inviting, at the minimum, SEC in-
vestigation and, in most cases, probable litigation and its attendant danger
that the issuance will be held not to qualify as a private placement.
Issuance under Section 3(a)(1 1), 9 the intrastate offering exemp-
tion, gives rise to less -uncertainty than surrounds issuances under the
private placement exemption. The provision exempts from Section 5
registration:
Any security which is part of an issue offered and sold only to per-
sons resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of
such security is a person resident and doing business within or, if a cor-
poration, incorporated by and doing business within, such State or
Territory.4
0
It should be observed that the availability of the intrastate exemption
does not depend upon the number of offerees involved, provided all
offerees are persons resident within a single state. The limited ex-
emption is thus directed towards ensuring that the effects of the of-
fering are confined within a single state. Accordingly, it is unneces-
sary to ascertain the public or nonpublic character of the offering as
would be the case with an interstate offering of securities.
Notwithstanding the above, some uncertainty does attend intra-
state public offerings scheduled in reliance upon the Section 3(a)(11)
exemption. These offerings become particularly dangerous when a
large number of security purchasers are involved in a plan of financ-
ing. The SEC takes the position that the entire issue of the securities
must be offered and sold exclusively to residents of the state in ques-
tion.41  "Consequently, an offer to a nonresident which is considered a
statement that "an offering of millions of dollars to non-institutional and non-affiliated
investors . . . would suggest that a public offering may be involved." SEC Se-
curities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962) (emphasis added). The restrictive intent
behind this statement is further evidenced by the SEC definition of an affiliate:
An "affiliate" of, or a person "affiliated" with, a specified person, is a person
that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is con-
trolled by, or is under control with, the [issuer]. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1972).
37. See note 33 supra.
38. See note 36 supra.
39. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)(11) (1970).
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961) provides in pertinent part:
A basic condition of the exemption is that the entire issue of securities be of-
fered and sold exclusively to residents of the state in question. Consequently, an
offer to a nonresident which is considered a part of the intrastate issue will
render the exemption unavailable to the entire offering.
1972]
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part of the intrastate issue will render the exemption unavailable to the
entire offering."42  It is the long-standing position of the SEC that a
single offer or sale to a nonresident causes the loss of the Section
3(a)(l1) exemption, not only for that individual sale, but for all
other securities involved in the issue.43  Thus, the risk to the issuer
relying on the Section 3 (a) (11) exemption increases in direct propor-
tion to the number of offerees. The validity of the issuer's exemption
will depend upon its ensuring that its entire issuance has taken place
within the state.44  Subsequent resales to non-residents by the original
purchasers must not occur before the securities involved have come to
rest within the state where the offering was undertaken. 45  Resales by
purchasers who acquired securities with a view to sell would be in-
consistent with the issuer's assertion that its distribution had already
been concluded. Necessarily, if these resales were to nonresidents, the
Section 3 (a) (11) exemption would be jeopardized because the out-of-
state distribution could be attributed to and deemed actuated by the
issuer.46
Other areas of uncertainty exist with respect to the Section 3(a)(11)
exemption. The question of what constitutes a "person resident" with-
in the meaning of the Section is one to which no judicial answer has yet
been provided. Although the SEC has taken the position that resi-
dence is equivalent to domicile,47 there exists no decisional law so
defining the term, and at least one renowned authority has disputed the
SEC's construction.4" When the issuer is a corporation, Section 3(a)
(11) requires that the business be incorporated by and doing business
within that state where the offering is made. The incorporation re-
quirement is obvious, but it remains unclear whether the courts will
attach a broad or a restricted meaning to the term "doing business."
At least one court has apparently construed the doing business re-
quirement as a requirement that the primary business of a corporation be




45. See 1 L. Loss, SECURMTES REGU.ATION 591-605 (2d ed. 1961). SEC Securities
Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
46. Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C. 147 (Commission Decision 1935)
(exemption is not available where the offering is made to resident underwriters or
other intermediaries who promptly resell to nonresidents).
47. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961).
48. See 1 L. Loss, SEcuRrrEs REGULATION 598-600 (2d ed. 1961).
49. SEC v. Truckee Showboat, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 824, 825 (S.D. Cal. 1957). See
Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1969), wherein the "doing business require-
[Vol. 5
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An issuer planning to employ multiple offerings for the purpose of
corporate finance should be made aware of the ever present danger
that the SEC will take the position that ostensibly separate offerings
made for the purpose of corporate finance should be "integrated! 5
for purposes of determining qualification for exemption under any
of the exemptive provisions of the 1933 Act. Whether the SEC
will integrate depends primarily on whether it appears that the vari-
ous issuances in question may be said to be parts of a single plan
or program of financing.51 For example, suppose that a corporation,
located and doing business within state X, undertakes a private
placement of securities in state Y and an intrastate sale of secu-
rities in state X. Assuming that all of the requisite procedures and
standards involved in making such exempted offerings have been com-
plied with, each issuance, considered separately, would be exempted
from application of Section 5 of the 1933 Act. However, if the two
offerings are in fact or substance made pursuant to a single plan or pro-
gram of financing, the SEC may integrate them by specifying each as
but one aspect of a larger offering.2 Should this occur, the intrastate
offering exemption would definitely be lost and the same result would
be likely with respect to the private placement exemption. This follows
from the fact that this larger offering, composed of the two smaller
and previously independent offerings, must itself now qualify for ex-
emption. 3 The intrastate offering exemption would be lost because
the securities involved in the original private placement in state Y were
offered and sold outside state X. The private placement exemption
would probably be lost since the tests for determining qualification for
that exemption would now be applied to a group of offerees consisting
ment" was held not to have been met where all income producing property was outside
the state, and where the issuer merely maintained an office and staff in the state from
which it offered and sold its securities.
50. See generally SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961); SEC Se-
curities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
51. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961). The SEC has cited
the following factors as relevant to the question of integration: (1) are the offerings
part of a single plan of financing; (2) do the offerings involve issuance of the same
class of security; (3) are the offerings made at or about the same time; (4) is the same
type of consideration to be received; and (5) are the offerings made for the same
general purpose. Id.
52. Id.
53. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961) states:
Whether an offering is "a part of an issue", that is, whether it is an integrated
part of an offering previously made or proposed to be made, is a question of fact
and depends essentially upon whether the offerings are a related part of a plan or
program. Thus, the [section 3(a)(11)] exemption should not be relied upon in
combination with another exemption for the different parts of a single issue where
part is offered or sold to nonresidents (citations omitted).
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of not only the offerees involved in the original private placement offer-
ing but also those offerees involved in the intrastate offering. Aside
from the effect which the addition of this latter group would have on
such private placement qualification factors as the number of offerees
and the monetary amount and the size of the offering, it is predictable
that at least some of the additional offerees would be held to be persons
who needed the protection of the Act since they did not possess those
attributes54 which render such protection unnecessary."
Obviously, the prerequisites of the exemptive provisions demand
exact compliance. The result of a willful or inadvertent failure to
comply with them will result in the non-availability of the respective
exemption and, accordingly, an unlawful interstate public distribution
of unregistered securities. The consequences of such an illegal distribu-
tion could well be disastrous. If, for example, the intrastate offering ex-
emption is lost through an offer or sale to a nonresident, then Section 5
will have been violated. The remedies afforded purchasers of securities
issued in violation of Section 5 are rescission or recovery of any losses
suffered in connection with the sale, plus interest. 6 A dissatisfied
client and disgruntled purchasers will be searching for funds; the former
to meets its obligations and the latter to recoup any losses suffered as
a result of the violating transaction. Under these circumstances a very
real danger exists that either or both might conclude that the attorneys
who afforded the legal advice with respect to the unlawful issuance will
provide "deep pockets" in which to conduct that search.
A HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION
The following hypothetical situation illustrates some of the more
common problems which could give rise to claims for legal malpractice
54. See text accompanying notes 21-39 supra.
55. It should be noted that no court has yet applied the "integration" doctrine.
But cf. Bowers v. Columbia General Corp., 336 F. Supp. 609, 624-25 (Del. 1971),
wherein the court states: "[it is fair to assume, however, that a court will ultimately
[apply the doctrine] when confronted with a series of offerings of unregistered securities
issued pursuant to a single financing plan .... ." Lack of judicial application of the
doctrine has not, however, deterred the SEC from its continued use. Cf. Texas
Glass Manufacturing Corp., 38 S.E.C. 630, 634 (Commission Decision, 1958),
wherein the SEC issued a stop order against an issuer whose prospectus contained
statements which were materially misleading, one such statement being the repre-
sentation that a prior series of related offerings were validly sold under the Section
3(a) (11) exemption.
56. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 5, 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970); MacClain v.
Bules, 275 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1960); Wal v. Wagner, 125 F. Supp. 854 (D.C. D. Neb.
1954), ajf'd sub nom., Whittaker v. Wall, 226 F.2d 868 (8th Cir. 1955).
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and Rule lOb-5 liability in the legal management of securities distribu-
tions. At the outset, it should be noted that this situation has innumer-
able possible variations, any one of which could significantly alter the
legal issues presented.
All of the stock of Fine Lines On Paper Co. [hereinafter "FLOP"],
a California corporation, has been owned by Mr. Jones for some ten
years. The corporation manufactures a unique product and has pro-
vided a comfortable living for Mr. Jones. However, business is too
good! FLOP is deluged with orders which it cannot meet. A larger
plant and expensive new equipment are required if the company is to
meet the demands of its customers and grow with the times. Although
Mr. Jones is financially sound, he is unable to provide the necessary
funds for these improvements and the local banks are unwilling to loan
him the amount required on acceptable terms. Mr. Jones' next thought
is to sell some of his corporation's stock. Accordingly, he seeks the
advice and aid of his lawyer, who recommends a private placement of
the proposed stock issuance.
Being a man of some means and excellent connections, Mr. Jones
interests ten of his wealthier friends, all experienced businessmen, in
each purchasing $100,000 worth of stock in FLOP. He thus raises
$1,000,000 for the expansion of his existing facilities and the purchase
of new equipment. Although the ten friends reside in different states,
Mr. Jones' lawyer is careful to comply with all of the requirements of the
respective Blue Sky laws for each state. The new shareholders are
pleased and enthusiastic about the quality of their investment. Mr.
Jones' lawyer receives a handsome fee for his work and all seems well.
FLOP proceeds with its expansion plans, but the costs of the nec-
essary improvements are greater than originally projected and it soon
becomes apparent that additional capital will be required. Moreover,
an opportunity arises to purchase a second factory and thereby further
increase production. Once again, Mr. Jones consults his lawyer who by
now has become general counsel for FLOP.
It is determined that $2,000,000 will be needed to complete the ex-
pansion plans as revised. Another private offering is ruled out since
Mr. Jones has no friends capable of raising so large a sum. The ex-
pense entailed in full registration is not an attractive prospect to FLOP
since the prospective issue is relatively small. Use of the Regulation A
offering exemption is precluded as well since a filing under Regulation
A is limited to offerings of less than $500,000 and involves the arduous
task of preparing an offering circular. However, counsel informs FLOP
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that there are no legal impediments to an intrastate offering and agrees
to prepare the necessary documents. 57 FLOP conducts substantially all
of its business in California so the offering is appealing to the corporate
officers and directors. They believe the necessary $2,000,000 can be
raised in large part from the many suppliers and customers of FLOP who
are already acquainted with its products. Moreover, California is a
wealthy state with a large investor population. Therefore, FLOP de-
cides to proceed with an intrastate offering.
Working feverishly to meet the offering schedule, counsel files all
the necessary documents with the appropriate California regulatory
agency, the Department of Corporations. The securities are slated for
sale only in California and to bona fide California residents and the funds
received from sales are to be employed to complete the revised plans for
expansion. FLOP's accountants prepare detailed financial reports,
including a certified report for the current fiscal year, and receive an
opinion from counsel that the securities, when issued as contemplated
by the offering circular, will be validly and legally authorized and issued,
fully paid and nonassessable. Shortly thereafter, the Department of
Corporations issues a permit authorizing the sale of the securities.5 8
FLOP advertises in local newspapers and mails copies of the offering
circular to its California customers and suppliers. The offering is a
huge success-200,000 shares are sold almost immediately for $10 per
share and FLOP appears to be on its way toward becoming a leading
manufacturer. Certain brokers specializing in new over-the-counter
securities begin to make a market in the stock and it advances to $20 per
share.
A year passes during which FLOP encounters increased production
costs, new competition, labor difficulties, and a diminished market for
its products. The price of its stock declines from the high of $20 per
share to $6 per share. Creditors become increasingly impatient and
shareholders begin to question the wisdom of their investment. Finally,
the local bank, hearing rumors that the SEC may view the two FLOP
offerings as being integrated and fearing that the shareholders will
exercise their resultant rescission rights, cuts off FLOP's line of credit.
FLOP is unable either to pay its debts as they mature or to secure other
57. Since this offering is exempt under the federal Securities Acts, an offering
circular or prospectus is not required. However, since FLOP Company is a Cal-
ifornia corporation, the California Commissioner of Corporations may require a prospec-
tus as a condition of qualification. CAL. Coap. CoDE ANN. § 25148 (West Supp.
1971).
1 58. Id. § 25113.
[Vol. 5
1972] LEGAL MALPRACTICE AND RULE lOb-5
credit. It therefore files either a petition seeking an arrangement with
its creditors59 or a petition for corporate reorganization. The creditors
are unwilling to accept any proffered plan and FLOP is adjudicated
bankrupt.60
The shareholders, suddenly faced with a complete loss of a market
for their shares, become irate about the turn of events. They file a
class action61 in the United States District Court under Sections 1262
59. Bankruptcy Act § 322, 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1970).
60. Bankruptcy Act § 236(2), 376(2), 11 U.S.C. §§ 636(2), 776(2) (1970).
The trustee in bankruptcy would apparently succeed to the issuer's right of action
against the attorney. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a)(6), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(6). The right
of action would constitute an asset of the estate and any recovery would be dis-
tributed for the benefit of all creditors. Dividends would be declared pursuant to the
order of priority set forth under Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. § 96
(1970)).
The injured shareholders' rights to damages would constitute provable claims in
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Act § 63(a), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1970). The enforcement
of such claims, however, would likely present somewhat of a problem for the bank-
ruptcy court with respect to the priority to be afforded them. It would seem in-
equitable to consider the injured shareholders as being of equal priority with general
unsecured trade creditors. Thus, the court might, in the exercise of its equity powers,
create a special category for the shareholders' claims, subordinating them to those of
the general creditors but placing them ahead of other shareholders.
Whether, after bankruptcy proceedings have been initiated, the shareholders would
be able to exercise their rescission rights (see note 56 supra) is an apparently unresolved
question and beyond the scope of this paper.
61. FED. R. Crv. P. 23 enables a defrauded stockholder to bring an action under
Rule 10b-5 on behalf of himself and all other stockholders similarly situated. The
Advisory Committee Notes to the Amendment to Rule 23 specifically mention that
private suits for fraud arising from a common misrepresentation would be properly
maintainable as class actions. Report of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Advisory Committee Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966). Prior to the 1966 amend-
ment, such an action was proper as a "spurious" class action under FED. R. Civ. P.
23(a)(3). Amended FED. R. Civ. P. 23, effective July 1, 1966, dispensed with the
distinctions drawn in the prior rule between "true," "hybrid," and "spurious" classes.
However, substantially the same requirements are present to maintain a class action
as were present in the prior rule. In Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of America,
43 F.R.D. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the prerequisites of a class action were stated
as follows:
(1) Joinder of all members of the class must be impossible because the class is
so numerous.
(2) There must be questions of law and fact common to the class which pre-
dominate over questions affecting only individual members of the class.
(3) The claims of the plaintiff must be typical of the claims of the class.
(4) The plaintiff must show that he will fairly and adequately protect the in-
terests of the class.
(5) The class action must be found superior to other means available for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the dispute.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 was added at the same time FFD. R. Civ. P. 23 was changed.
This rule requires that the plaintiff in a derivative action be a stockholder at the time
of the transaction complained of, or that the share devolve upon him by operation of
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and 1763 of the 1933 Act, Section 10b of the 1934 ActG4 and Rule
10b-5 65 promulgated thereunder.6" Notably, the attorney is named as
one of the defendants in the class action. Additionally, cross-claims
alleging a cause of action for legal malpractice against the attorney are
filed by his codefendants, the issuer and others also involved in the
illegal offering. Facing potential liabilities amounting to millions of
dollars, the attorney notifies his insurance carrier who promptly responds
with a "reservation of rights" statement. This statement is intended to
absolve the insurer from liability for damages assessed pursuant to Sec-
tion 12 of the 1933 Act for violation of Section 5 or awarded pursuant to
the fraud provisions of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE
Although a corporation, as a client, can maintain a malpractice
action against its attorney, the law is unsettled on whether shareholders
can maintain a class action against a negligent attorney who renders
services in connection with an unregistered public offering. Clearly,
the right to maintain an action against the corporation for damages
law. See Bateson v. Magna Oil Corp., 414 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 911 (1970).
62. Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
63. Securities Act of 1933 § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970).
64. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10b, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security.
66. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970), grants ex-
clusive jurisdiction over securities violations to the federal courts. Where the facts un-
derlying a complaint under Rule lOb-5 would sustain a claim under state common law
or statute, the state law count, if susceptible to proof by substantially identical evidence
adducible under the federal count, may be included under the rule of pendant jurisdic-
tion. Wolfson v. Blumberg, 229 F. Supp. 191, 192-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), citing Hum v.
Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933) as announcing the doctrine of pendant jurisdiction.
LEGAL MALPRACTICE AND RULE 10b-5
resulting from its unlawful distribution of securities exists in the recipient
shareholders. 7 However, this right has minimal value when the cor-
poration is in financial difficulty or is already involved in bankruptcy
proceedings. Often, the negligent attorney represents the only possible
source of recovery for injured shareholders and, accordingly, the devel-
oping trend in California is to allow the maintenance of a class action
suit in similar situations.68
Generally, plaintiff-clients in legal malpractice cases can plead causes
of action in both contract and tort. 9 Often, however, a significant
impediment to recovery exists when a cause of action in contract is
asserted by a plaintiff not in privity of contract with the defendant
attorney. The law is well-settled that contractual liability cannot be
imposed upon a contracting party by a person not a party to the con-
sensual agreement from which such liability arises. 70 However, virtually
all American jurisdictions recognize the right of a third-party beneficiary
to enforce through direct legal action the contractual agreement which
benefits him.71  This rule is followed regardless of whether the third
party is a donee or creditor beneficiary.72 Only incidental beneficiaries
67. Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 47 F.R.D. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See also
Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970) (wherein a rescission is
provided against any person who sells a security in violation of the registration re-
quirements); Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 329 F.2d 909 (9th Cir.
1964).
68. See Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796
(1971), wherein plaintiffs, consumer purchasers of merchandise under installment
contracts, were allowed to maintain a class action seeking rescission of the contracts
for fraudulent misrepresentation against both the seller and the finance companies to
whom the contracts had been assigned. For the federal rules governing class actions,
see note 61 supra.
69. Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 203 n.6, 491 P.2d 433, 438 n.6, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849,
854 n.6 (1971); Neel v. Magana, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 182, 491 P.2d 421, 424, 98 Cal. Rptr.
837, 840 (1971); Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 227, 449 P.2d 161, 163-64, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 227-28 (1969); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr.
821 (1961). The contract theory of recovery was extended to intended beneficiaries
under a negligently drafted will in Lucas v. Harm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15
Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961). The doctrinal validity of this extension has since been ques-
tioned. See Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 227, 232, 449 P.2d 161, 164, 167, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 228 (1969). There, Justice Tobriner incisively noted that the third-party
beneficiary contractual remedy "is conceptually superfluous since the crux of the ac-
tion must lie in tort in any case; there can be no recovery without negligence." Id.
at 227, 449 P.2d at 164, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
70. 2 S. WLLIsToN, CONTRACTS § 347 (Jaeger, 3d ed. 1959).
71. 4 A. ConmN, CoNTAcrs §§ 772, 774 (1951); 2 S. WrisToN, CONTRACTS
§§ 347, 354, 356 (Jaeger, 3d ed. 1959); REsTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CoNTRACrs
§§ 133-36 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1967).
72. REsTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 133, 135-36 (1932). The donee and creditor
third-party beneficiary classifications are now giving way to a single intended beneficiary
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have been consistently denied the right to maintain actions as third-party
beneficiaries.73
The third-party beneficiary principle was extended to encompass
the attorney malpractice area in the case of Lucas v. Hamm.74  In
that case, the California Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the testa-
mentary beneficiaries under a negligently drafted will were not merely
incidential beneficiaries, but intended third-party beneficiaries who could
therefore sue the testator's attorney under contract theory for his error
in drafting the wiIl. 75 However, the same court, in the case of
Heyer v. Flaig,76 subsequently questioned its earlier reliance on the con-
tract theory of recovery:
Our analysis of the decision in Lucas points to the conceptual super-
fluity of the third-party beneficiary rationale of that case: the right of
action sounds in tort and enures by reason of our determination that
public policy requires the recognition of a duty of care on the part of
the attorney which accrues directly to the third party, the intended
beneficiary.
77
In so analyzing its decision in Lucas, the supreme court in Heyer implied
that in future attorney malpractice litigation the courts will emphasize
the tort instead of the contract theory of recovery.78
classification. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Introductory Note, ch. 6, p. 3
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1967). The scope of the intended beneficiary classification is de-
limited ultimately only by policy considerations:
[I]f the beneficiary would be reasonable in "relying on the promise as mani-
festing an intention to confer a right on him, he is an intended beneficiary.
Where there is doubt whether such reliance would be reasonable, considerations
of procedural convenience and other factors not strictly dependent on the mani-
fested intention of the parties may affect the question whether ... recognition of
a right in the beneficiary is appropriate. In some cases an overriding policy,
which may be embodied in a statute, requires recognition of such a right without
regard to the intention of the parties. Id. at § 133, comment d at 14-15.
73. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 147 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1967). "An
incidental beneficiary is a person who will be benefited by performance of a promise
but who is neither a promisee nor an intended beneficiary." Id. at § 147, comment a
at 83.
74. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961).
75. Id. at 590-91, 364 P.2d at 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
76. 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).
77. Id. at 232, 449 P.2d at 167, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
78. Cf. Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 491 P.2d 433, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971);
Neel v. Magana, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971). Note,
however, that where there are no consequential or actual damages suffered as a direct
result of the attorney's negligence, a tort cause of action will not lie. In such a situa-
tion the plaintiffs only remedy is the contractual one. Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195,
200, 203 n.6, 491 P.2d 433, 436, 438 n.6, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852, 854 n.6 (1971).
While the courts may, in the future, emphasize the tort theory of recovery, the
contract theory may and should nonetheless be plead. Negligence on the part of the
attorney in rendering legal services, in addition to serving as the foundation of the
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By emphasizing the tort theory of recovery, the courts could avoid
the necessity of confronting the conceptual difficulties inherent in third-
party beneficiary contract theory."" Other conceptual difficulties would
arise, however, in connection with the application of the various elements
of the tort cause of action to the factual circumstances ordinarily in-
volved in a securities transaction. More precisely, such difficulties
would arise in connection with the interrelated elements of duty and prox-
imate cause unless and until the courts carry the expansion of the duty
concept, as described in the above quotation from Heyer, over into the
securities area. The duty imposed on the lawyer rendering advice and
services with respect to a securities transaction would thus be broadened
to encompass the third-party securities purchasers involved in and injured
by the lawyer's breach of his obligation to exercise that standard of pro-
fessional care and expertise expected of the average reasonable securities
lawyer rendering like services.8 0 While at present there exist no cases
directly imposing such an expanded duty, imposition of this duty could
readily occur and be justified by the various policy considerations which
have in the past led courts to deem a given plaintiff's interest to be entitled
to judicial protection.81  In Connor v. Great Western Savings and Loan
Association,82 the California Supreme Court, after rejecting the strictures
of the contractual concept of privity, delineated the policy considerations
relevant to determining the existence of duty as follows:
(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff, (2) the foreseeability of harm to him, (3) the degree of cer-
tainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the closeness of the con-
nection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, (5)
the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and (6) the
policy of preventing future harm. 83
tort claim, will constitute a breach of contract for legal services. Neel v. Magana,
6 Cal. 3d 176, 181, 491 P.2d 421, 423, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 839 (1971). When the cor-
poration contracts with an attorney for legal services to be rendered in connection with
a securities offering, it contracts for legal work to be done in such a manner as to
result in a lawful and valid issuance of such securities. To the extent that the pur-
chasers benefit from the foregoing implied provision of the contract for legal services,
they may be third-party beneficiaries, just as were the beneficiaries under the will in
Lucas and Heyer.
79. See text accompanying notes 69-75 supra.
80. See text accompanying notes 91-93 infra.
81. See, e.g., Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969);
Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961). See also
Lathrop, Legal Malpractice: Plaintiffs, Limiting Statutes and Heyer v. Flaig, 37 INs.
CouNsELJ . 258 (1970).
82. 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).
83. Id. at 865, 447 P.2d at 617, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377, quoting Biakanja v. Irving,
49 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958).
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Applying these factors to the case of purchasers injured as a result
of negligent legal services rendered in connection with the issuance of
securities would clearly seem to call for recognition of the existence of
a duty owed such purchasers by the attorneys rendering such services.
The applicability of the interrelated factors, "the extent to which
the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff" and "the fore-
seeability of harm," seems clear. When an attorney is employed
to render legal services and advice in connection with a securities of-
fering, the obvious and hoped for result of his labors is to assist the
issuer in bringing about the acquisition of those securities by purchas-
ers. Additionally, in many purported exempted offerings, the attor-
ney will have personal knowledge of the individuals who constitute the
intended purchasers. It is common knowledge that the viability of the
purchaser's investment often depends upon the legality of the entire
stock issuance. Thus, there is little question but that the correctness
of the legal work in a securities transaction is intended to and will
affect the purchaser of these securties. Considering the foreseeability
of harm and given the very nature of securities transactions themselves, it
is almost certain that purchasers will be injured by illegal public offer-
ings. The degree of injury is the only real matter of uncertainty.
With respect to the question of the closeness of the connection between
the conduct of the attorney and the injury suffered by plaintiff pur-
chasers, assuming the issuer would not have intentionally made an
unlawful public offering, it could be established that but for the
attorney's negligence and miscalculation the harm would not have oc-
curred. There is little question about the existence of a policy in favor
of preventing such harm; such a policy is clearly evidenced by the
enactment- of the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5 promul-
gated under Section 10b of the latter Act. Perhaps the most difficult
factor to be established in the type of case here under consideration is
the moral blame attached to the attorney's conduct. The presence or
absence of such blame, of course, will vary from case to case, the
basic tenet being that employment should not be accepted by a lawyer
when he is unable to render competent service. 4  Thus, it could be
argued that, both professionally and morally, the attorney should not
have accepted the assignment if he was incapable of rendering ade-
quate legal services in connection with such sophisticated transactions.
In sum, then, where there is harm which is substantially caused by the
84. A.B.A., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 2, Ethical Consideration
No. 2-30; see also Professional Responsibility: Requirement of the Joint Conference,
44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1218 (1958).
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attorney's negligent performance of legal services rendered in connec-
tion with securities transactions, a strong argument exists that the requi-
site considerations for imposition of a duty towards third-party pur-
chasers are present.
In Heyer, the California Supreme Court succinctly stated the rationale
for the imposition of a duty upon attorneys which would protect the
certain and foreseeable rights and interests of persons other than the
client:
[T]he duty . . stems from the attorney's undertaking to perform
legal services for the client but reaches out to protect the intended
beneficiary. We impose this duty because of the relationship between
the attorney and the intended beneficiary; public policy requires that
the attorney exercise his position of trust and superior knowledge re-
sponsibly so as not to affect adversely persons whose rights and in-
terests are certain and foreseeable.8 5
This rationale is clearly applicable to purchasers injured as the result
of negligent legal services rendered in connection with the issuance of
securities. Purchasers in such transactions are certainly persons whose
rights and interests are "certain and foreseeable." The attorney actu-
ally preparing the documents and legal strategy required for any offer-
ing certainly knows that the eventual purchasers will be among those
relying on his superior knowledge and legal skills. As pointed out
above, injury to such purchasers is readily foreseeable if errors are
made which are likely to affect the legal status and financial viability
of the securities purchased. Further, the gravity of the potential harm
to be suffered is greater in the case of a person injured by an unlawful
issuance of securities than in the case of a testamentary beneficiary
damaged by the loss of a portion of an intended bequest. In the
former case, the purchaser of the unlawfully issued securities suffers
an actual out-of-pocket loss, whereas, in the latter case, the testamen-
tary beneficiary suffers no such loss and normally places no substan-
tial reliance on the proceeds not yet in hand.
Whether the attorney is ultimately held to owe a duty only to the
issuer-client or to both the issuer-client and the third-party purchasers
as well, it must be determined what is the standard or degree of care and
skill to which the attorney should be held with respect to the fulfill-
ment of such duty or duties. It appears to be the current rule in
California that attorneys are required to render services with that de-
gree of "skill, prudence and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and
85. 70 Cal. 2d at 228-29, 449 P.2d at 165, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 229 (emphasis added).
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capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of the
tasks which they undertake."8 6 However, considering the fact that the
responsibility for compliance with the requirements for securities dis-
tributions under the 1933 Act rests with the attorney, it would seem
appropriate to expect the attorney to exercise that degree of skill and
care exhibited by the average practitioner specializing in the law of
securities regulation.8 7  Significantly, physicians practicing in a recog-
nized area of specialization are required to perform at a level of com-
petence exemplified by the average specialist's performance of like
procedures. 8  The medical specialist analogy has been recognized by
at least one California appellate court, at least with respect to the rules
of evidence for legal malpractice cases:
This rule has been applied in California to medical malpractice
cases, and while no cases have been found in this state applying the
rule to legal malpractice, there is no reason why the rules of evidence
for malpractice against a lawyer should not be the same as those gov-
erning cases against doctors. It has been so held in other jurisdic-
tions.
o89
It is contended that the attorney rendering legal services in connection
with the issuance of securities is practicing in an area which should be
recognized as one of specialization. Thus, the general practitioner
who offers legal advice concerning the intricate and specialized se-
curities regulation laws should be held to a standard of skill and care
consistent with'the practices of a securities law specialist performing
in a like transaction. 90
86. Neel v. Magana, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 180, 491 P.2d 421, 422-23, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837,
838-39 (1971).
.87. See Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 1442 (1968).
88. Cf. Belshaw v. Feinstein, 258 Cal. App. 2d 711, 65 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1968);
Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., 62 Cal. 2d 154, 159-60, 397 P.2d 161, 164, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 577, 580 (1964); Sansom v. Ross-Loos Medical Group, 57 Cal. App. 2d 549,
555-56, 134 P.2d 927, 931 (1943); Slimak v. Foster, 106 Conn. 366, 138 A. 153
(1927).
89. Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 156, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 419 (1968).
90. See Ned v. Magana, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 188, 491 P.2d 421, 428, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837,
844 (1971); Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLuM. L. REv. 1292, 1302-04 (1963).
While lawyers are licensed generally in virtually all jurisdictions and are presumably
"qualified" to practice in any area of the law, there is a growing trend toward cer-
tification of lawyers as specialists in certain areas. Pedrick, Collapsible Specialists,
55 A.B.A.J. 324, 325 (1969). The California State Bar is currently considering the
certification of lawyers for specialized practice in the fields of criminal law, taxation
and workmen's compensation. The authors believe that the area of securities transac-
tions under the 1933 and 1934 Acts should be added to this list of fields being consid-
ered for certification.
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Once such a standard is recognized, it will be necessary to deter-
mine the size of the geographical unit upon which the standard should
be based. During the evolution of medical malpractice law, it was
argued, in an attempt to limit the physician's liability, that the stand-
ards determinative of whether a breach of duty had occurred were
those recognized in the local geographic area in which the act was
committed. 1 A growing number of courts, however, have rejected
this argument and held defendants in medical malpractice suits to
a duty of care evidenced by national standards of practice, which
were to be determined by reference to the state of scientific knowledge
in existence at the date of the alleged malpractice.92  Since the federal
securities statutes are intended to regulate securities transactions through-
out the country, it is reasonable to insist that attorneys render legal
services at a level of competence consistent with a national standard.
Further, there would appear to be no substantial problems involved in
ascertaining such a national standard since private securities law
specialists, as well as attorneys employed by governmental agencies,
could be utilized as expert witnesses to facilitate the ascertainment of the
standard.93
91. See PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 32 (3d ed. 1964).
92. See, e.g., Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973, 978 (1967),
wherein the court stated:
The degree of care which must be observed is, of course, that of an average,
competent practitioner acting in the same or similar circumstances. In other
words, local practice within geographic proximity is one, but not the only
factor to be considered. No longer is it proper to limit the definition of the stand-
ard of care which a medical doctor or dentist must meet solely to the practice or
custom of a particular locality, a similar locality, or a geographic area.
See also Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 50 Ill. App. 2d 253,
200 N.E.2d 149 (1964), aff'd, 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 946 (1966); Dickinson v. Mailliard, - Iowa -, 175 N.W.2d 588, 596-97
(1970). California adopted the broader standard in 1956. Leonard v. Watsonville
Community Hospital, 47 Cal. 2d 509, 519, 305 P.2d 36, 42 (1956).
93. Until recently, the question of negligence or want of skill by an attorney was
considered to be a question of law by the California courts. Gambert v. Hart,
44 Cal. 542, 552 (1872). Expert testimony on the question was therefore excluded as
an inadmissible expression of opinion. Id. at 549, Note, 15 HAST. LJ. 584 (1964).
Now, however, it is recognized that attorney malpractice is governed by the same
principles as any other negligence action, and that breach of duty is a factual issue for
the jury. Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 525-29, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592,
595-97 (1966). Accordingly, expert testimony concerning the degree of skill expected
of an ordinary attorney is now admitted. See Lysick v. Walcolm, 258 Cal. App. 2d
136, 155-56, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 419-20 (1968). Furthermore, such testimony, being
concerned with matters not within the common knowledge of laymen, is conclusive
and cannot be disregarded by the jury. Id. Some courts have even held that expert
testimony is indispensable in attorney malpractice actions. Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d
1442, 1443-44 (1968). But see id. at 1444; 17 A.L.R.3d 60-61 (Supp. 1972).
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Thus far, we have been concerned only with possible legal malprac-
tice liability of counsel for failure to adequately or properly qualify his
client for the exemptive provisions of the federal securities law, and
more particularly, failure to supervise his client's plan of financing.
The unfortunate lawyer in the hypothetical situation proceeded in
blissful ignorance of the integration problem as well as countless other
potentially troublesome issues such as: the questions of servicemen
purchasers,94 purchases by partnerships having partners outside the
state,95 and purchases by resident agents for nonresident principals,90
to mention but a few. These and other foreseeable problems should
have been noted, examined and taken into consideration by the attor-
ney in advising his client. At this point, however, let us leave our
consideration of the legal malpractice area and foous attention on an-
other possible cause of action which might exist against the occasional
legal "specialist" with respect to his advice and services rendered in
connection with the issuance of securities.
RULE 10b-5 LIABILITY
Irrespective of the viability of an action based upon traditional prin-
ciples of legal malpractice, it is possible that an action against an at-
torney who renders negligent advice and services in connection with
an issuance of securities, resulting in injury to the issuer-client and
the purchasers of the securities issued, may be maintained under Sec-
tion 10b of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by
the SEC. Some experienced securities law analysts, however, have
suggested that an action brought against the attorney under Section 10b
and Rule 10b-5 should and would be rejected by the courts.97 On
94. See Op. Gen. Counsel, SEC Securities Act Release No. 1459 (May 29, 1937);
SEC v. Big Top, Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 2756 (Oct. 2, 1963).
95. See, e.g., 1 L. Loss, SEcURTES REGULATION 600 (2d ed. 1961). Consider the
dangers presented where members of the purchasing partnership are residents of several
states. While the issue does not appear to have been litigated, it is arguable that sale
to such a partnership could result in the loss of the intrastate exemption. McCauley,
Intrastate Securities Transactions under the Federal Securities Act, 107 U. PA. L. REV.
937, 948 (1959).
96. See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
97. Marsh, What Lies Ahead Under Rule 10b-5?, 24 Bus. LAw. 69 (1968). Pro-
fessor Marsh postulates an involved fact situation in which a corporation violates Sec-
tion 16b of the 1934 Act as the result of a series of corporate purchases. A share-
holder then brings an action against corporate counsel under Section 10b and Rule
10b-5 alleging that counsel represented that he would give competent legal advice to
the corporation and would ensure that the corporation would avoid liability under
Section 16b. Professor Marsh concluded that he was not willing to say that the
federal courts would take jurisdiction of such an action as of the date the article was
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the other hand, other such analysts have taken note of the expanding
applicability of both the Section and the Rule and have indicated that a
deluge of such actions should not be -unexpected."' There is little
question but that the SEC concurs with the latter position, as evi-
denced by its recent action against two prominent law firms for se-
curities fraud under Section 10b and Rule lOb-5Y9
Generally, the success of a lawsuit based upon the implied civil lia-
bility arising from a violation of Section 10b and Rule lOb-5 is de-
pendent upon the plaintiff's ability to establish "fraud . . .or deceit
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 100  Suc-
cinctly, this involves the satisfaction of three distinct statutory pre-
requisites to the successful maintenance of a Rule lOb-5 cause of ac-
tion. There must be: (1) a fraud or other deceitful practice (2) per-
petrated in connection with (3) the purchase or sale of any security.
Further, a judicial rule requires the plaintiff to be either a purchaser
or seller of the security which was the subject of the fraud or deceitful
practice.' 0 ' Notably, Rule lOb-5 is applicable regardless of whether
the purchase or sale is conducted through a securities exchange, an
organized over-the-counter market, or in a private transaction.
0 2
It is well-settled that it is not necessary to allege all of the tradi-
tional elements of common law fraud to maintain an action under Rule
10b-5.10 3  However, the necessity of alleging one particular element,
written. Id. at 72. See also Lathrop, Legal Malpractice: Plaintiffs, Limiting Statutes
and Heyer v. Flaig, 37 INS. COUNSEL J. 258, 263 (1970).
98. See Marsh, supra note 97, at 69, wherein Professor Marsh notes facetiously:
Several weeks ago I told one of the ablest and most experienced corporate
counsel in California that my assigned topic was "What lies ahead under Rule
10b-52" He advised me to stand up and say: "Chaos!", and then sit down.
Another friend of mine who is a corporate lawyer said: "Really, it seems to me
that it is quite simple. Under Rule lob-5 whenever stock is sold, if the price goes
up-the seller can sue the buyer; if the price goes down-the buyer can sue the
seller; if the price remains absolutely the same, each one can sue the other for
interest!"
99. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., Civil No. 225-72 (D.D.C., filed
Feb. 3, 1972).
100. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972). See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971), wherein Justice Douglas reiterates the require-
ments from Rule lOb-5 itself and states that they are to be construed "flexibly."
101. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952). For an interesting discussion of the viability of the "purchaser/
seller" requirement see Boone, Standing To Sue Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 49 Tx. L. REv.
617 (1971). Notably, the Ninth Circuit has reaffirmed the validity of the Birnbaum
doctrine in Mount Clemens Industries, Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972).
102. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10
(1971), citing Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th
Cir. 1960).
103. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
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namely scienter, the guilty knowledge of the defendant and the intent
to deceive, has long been debated. The lower federal courts have
not been uniform in determining the showing of scienter required
in an action under Section 10b and Rule lOb-5. 0 4 While a specific
intent to deceive may not be required in any federal jurisdiction,'
the Second Circuit has consistently maintained that some degree of
scienter must be alleged and proven.106 The Seventh, 07 Eighth,10 8
Ninth," 9  and Tenth 10  Circuits have no such requirement. This
394 U.S. 976 (1969); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965); Royal
Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962). Cf. SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
104. See Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
wherein the court noted:
Until the "great debate over ordinary negligence versus scienter in private ac-
tions under 10(b) and Rule 10b-5", . . . is resolved, this court will adhere to
the most recent views expressed by this Circuit, that plaintiffs must show
more than that the . . . press release was negligently prepared. They must show
some degree of scienter. Id. at 1343-44, quoting Globus v. Law Research Service,
Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1291 (2d Cir. 1969).
The Supreme Court, in construing the antifraud provision of the Investment Ad-
visors Act of 1940, which is similar to Rule 10b-5. declared that the manifest purpose
of that Act would be defeated were they to hold that "Congress in empowering the
courts to enjoin any practice which operates 'as a fraud or deceit' . . . intended to re-
quire proof of intent to injure and actual injury to the client." SEC v. Capital Gains Re-
search Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
105. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969), wherein the court said:
However, whether the case before us is treated solely as an SEC enforcement
proceeding or as a private action, proof of a specific intent to defraud is un-
necessary. In an enforcement proceeding for equitable or prophylactic relief, the
common law standard of deceptive conduct has been modified in the interests of
broader protection for the investing public so that negligent insider conduct has
become unlawful. A similar standard has been adopted in private actions, for
policy reasons which seem perfectly consistent with the broad Congressional de-
sign ". .. to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets in ...
[securities] transactions." Id. at 854-55 (citations omitted).
106. Id. at 855:
This requirement [some form of the traditional scienter requirement], whether it
be termed lack of diligence, constructive fraud, or unreasonable or negligent
conduct, remains implicit in this standard, a standard that promotes the deter-
rence objective of the Rule (emphasis added).
107. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963) (neither knowledge
of the falsity nor bad faith intent to deceive are necessary to prove a violation under
Rule lOb-5 in a civil action for damages).
108. See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 951 (1968) (innocent nondisclosures which amount to deceptive conduct are
prohibited under Rule lOb-5).
109. Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962);
Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961) (unnecessary for the plaintiff to
allege common law fraud to sustain a cause of action).
110. Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965):
It is not necessary to allege or prove common law fraud to make out a case under
the statute and rule. It is only necessary to prove one of the prohibited actions such
as the material misstatement of fact or the omission to state a material fact.
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does not mean, however, that all or most of these circuits are mov-
ing toward the imposition of strict liability under the Rule. Rath-
er, they have approached the problem by shifting the burden of
proof to the defendants. For example, once the plaintiff has shown a
material misrepresentation or omission of fact, the burden shifts to the
defendants to establish that they did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of the material misrepresenta-
tion or omission.'11 Arguably, the result is that the same proof must
be adduced as to the ultimate issue of the existence of fraud or de-
ceitful practice regardless of the forum. As a practical matter, how-
ever, under the rule followed in the Second Circuit, a plaintiff may ex-
pect to encounter great difficulty in getting past law and motion pro-
ceedings in the absence of specific allegations of scienter. Although,
as pointed out above, none of the circuits have actually imposed strict
liability under the Rule, it should be noted that the Eighth Circuit has
propounded a rationale that could evolve into the imposition of strict
liability upon a finding of material misrepresentation or omission. In
Myzel v. Fields,"2 the court stated, by way of dicta, that:
[S]uch conduct [innocent nondisclosures which may amount to manipu-
lative or deceptive conduct] is prohibited within the definitiofi of Rule
10b-5. The violation of the Rule connotes "unfairness" or "wrong-
doing."" 3
Turning to a consideration of the "in connection with" requirement
of the Rule, it now appears that as a result of the Supreme Court's
decision in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co.," 4 the prerequisites for meeting this requirement have been
111. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 102 (10th Cir. 1971), quoting
Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 357 (10th Cir. 1970):
One is not to be held liable * * * because of his misleading misrepresentation
or omission of material fact, the truth of the matter being unknown to the pur-
chaser, if the party responsible for the. misrepresentation or omission sustains the
burden of proving that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known that it was a misrepresentation or omission.
112. 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
113. Id. at 748.
114. 404 U.S. 6 (1971). Although the facts are highly involved, it is well worth
sorting them out to understand the extension of the "in connection with" requirement.
For purposes of clarity, the facts may be outlined in step transactions as follows:
(1) Begole and Bourne (B&B) enter into an executory contract with Bankers Life
to purchase that company's wholly owned subsidiary, Manhattan, for five million dol-
lars.
(2) Irving Trust agrees to issue an as yet unfunded check for the above amount
(check #1) to B&B.
(3) At the closing, check #1 is delivered to Bankers Life who then gives B&B
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relaxed. In that case, the securities sale was apparently legitimate,
but the seller did not receive any proceeds from the sale due to a
sophisticated and allegedly fraudulent scheme which surrounded it.
The Court concluded that the overall transaction was effected through
an act or practice which allegedly operated as a fraud or deceit." 5
The Court stated that "[t]he crux of the present case is that Man-
hattan [the seller] suffered an injury as a result of deceptive practices
touching its sale of securities as an investor.""" A lower court has
all the stock of Manhattan.
(4) After the closing, but on that same day, the new president of Manhattan, in-
stalled by B&B, has over four and one-half million dollars worth of Treasury Bonds
in Manhattan's portfolio sold in a bona fide transaction.
(5) The proceeds from the sale, plus enough cash from Manhattan to amount to
five million dollars are deposited in an account in Irving Trust in Manhattan's name.
Check #1 is credited against this account.
(6) To conceal this loss of assets, a round robin financing scheme is devised.
Irving Trust issues check #2 in the amount of five million dollars payable to Belgian
Trust.
(7) Manhattan exchanges this check with Belgian Trust for a six-month cer-
tificate of deposit worth five million dollars.
(8) Manhattan assigns the certificate of deposit to New England Note Company
(whose president is Bourne). While the certificate of deposit is carried on the books
at full value, the assignment is not revealed.
(9) New England Note then assigns the certificate of deposit to Belgian Trust in
exchange for a five million dollar loan.
(10) New England Note uses the proceeds of the loan to cover check #2 issued
by Irving Trust.
The sale that is being litigated under § 10(b) is step (4), i.e., the sale of the treas-
ury bonds in a bona fide transaction. The asserted "fraud" was that the seller of the
bonds, Manhattan, was "duped into believing that it ...would receive the proceeds."
Id. at 9. Thus, although the actual sale was legitimate, the aura of fraud surrounding
it was sufficient for redress under § 10(b).
Professor Bromberg stated, during a discussion with one author on March 17, 1972,
that the decision in Bankers Life was "not that much of a surprise" when considered
against the background of earlier cases in the field.
Morton I. Schlossberg, counsel for the successful petitioner in Bankers Life, believes
an expansion of the classes of proper parties plaintiff can be expected in the future as
a result of the Bankers Life decision. He suggested that creditors of corporations may
eventually be proper plaintiffs although both Professor Bromberg and Mr. Schlossberg
agreed that may be some ways off.
It is interesting to consider the possible ramifications of an action brought directly
by creditors against the lawyers for the issuer, as in the situation where the corporate
issuer is in bankruptcy proceedings. However, in such a situation it is arguable that
a purchase or sale of securities would not be involved. Both Professor Bromberg and
Mr. Schlossberg agree that a purchase or sale of securities must be involved somewhere
before a 10b-5 action can be maintained. (Conversation with one author March 17,
1972).
115. 404 U.S. at 12-13.
116. Id. (emphasis added).
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construed the Bankdrs Life decision to mean that "where there is a
causal connection between the purchase or sale of stock, the alleged
fraud or breach of fiduciary duty, and plaintiffs loss then federal
jurisdiction under 10b-5 exists."' " 7  Obviously, if this liberal con-
struction of the "in connection with" requirement is affirmed, the
number of potential 10b-5 plaintiffs will be increased.
In order to maintain a successful lOb-5 action for fraud or deceit
based upon misrepresentation or omission of matter in the informa-
tion conveyed which causes such information to be misleading,""
there exists the additional requirement that such omission or misstate-
ment be "material." 1 9  Numerous definitions of materiality have been
formulated and employed by the courts.. 2  For example, profit and
loss data accumulated over a very short period of time may not be ma-
terial if the variance from prior periods is slight. On the other hand,
a severe loss might be of tremendous materiality even though a brief
time period is involved.' 2 ' In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,122 the
lower court defined material facts as those which "if disclosed would
have had a substantial impact on the market price of TGS stock."' 23
On appeal, the Second Circuit substantially modified the test, de-
fining materiality as "not only information disclosing the earnings and
distributions of a company but also those facts which may affect . . .
the desire of investors to buy, sell, or hold the company's securities."'
2 4
117. Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 842 (D.N.J. 1972). This
court also held that the purchaser-seller requirement first enunciated in Birnbaum
v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952) was no longer determinative of federal jurisdiction in the light of Bankers
Life. Tully, supra at 839. It is interesting to note that the Second Circuit, when urged
by the SEC to review its own doctrine in Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir.
1972), refused to do so.
118. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1971).
119. Id.
120. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURrrIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 1127-
32 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as JENNINGS & MARSH]. Professor Bromberg posits
that materiality can be expected to be a "hard-fought" issue in nearly every Rule 10b-5
case. 2 A. BROMBoEG, SECuRniE LAW FRAUD SEC RULE 10b-5, § 8.3, at 202 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as BROMBERG].
121. JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 120, at 1127-32. See Weitzen v. Keams, 271
F. Supp. 616, 619-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
122. 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
123. Id. at 282. It is interesting to note that California has adopted a similar test
of materiality in its insider trading provisions of the California Corporate Securities
Law of 1968. CAL. CORP. CODE H9 25402, 25502 (West Supp. 1971).
124. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(l) (1971), wherein the SEC
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Thus, facts are material if a "reasonable man would attach importance
[to them] in determining his choice of action" with respect to any
given securities transaction. 25
It is well-settled that an attorney who has actively participated in a
fraudulent 126 scheme or practice is a proper defendant in a Rule
10b-5 action.' 27 The question thus arises as to what constitutes "ac-
tive" participation on the part of an attorney in such a scheme or prac-
tice. The limited case law touching on the question reveals an ap-
parent divergence of judicial opinion.
12
In the recent case of Black & Co. v. Nova-Tech, Inc.,20 several
members of a California law firm were named as defendants in a Rule
10b-5 action merely because the firn's name was mentioned in the
corporate client's annual report as counsel for the company. The fed-
eral district court held that the "firm's designation on Nova-Tech's
published reports as Nova-Tech's corporate counsel is enough*. . . to
make the firm's partners 'participants' in any unlawful securities trans-
actions in which the annual reports were used for promotional pur-
defines materiality under the 1933 Act:
The term "material," when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of
information as to any subject, limits the information required to those matters as
to which an average prudent investor ought reasonably be informed before pur-
chasing the security registered.
Plaintiffs are not required to show that they relied on the material misstatement
"whenever a device was employed 'of a sort that would cause reasonable investors to
rely thereon, and ...purchase or sell a corporation's securities.'" Gottlieb v. Sandia
American Corp., 452 F.2d 510, 515-16 (3d Cir. 1971), quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968).
125. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) quoting
List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1968).
126. It should be noted that the term "fraudulent" is here being used in the se-
curities law instead of the common law sense. See text accompanying notes 103-13
supra.
127. See, e.g., Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.
1960) (holding a lawyer to be a proper defendant where he falsely wrote a letter to
the transfer agent stating in his opinion the transaction in question was exempt from
SEC registration); cf. Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969) (law-
yer held for trial for alleged liability under § 12(1) of the '33 Act as a party to a solici-
tation to buy); Gottlieb v. Sandia American Corp., 304 F. Supp. 980 (E.D. Pa. 1969),
rev'd on other grounds, 452 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1971) (special counsel to corporation who
was also a controlling stockholder held liable under Rule lOb-5 for participation in
fraud). See generally 2 BROMBERO, supra note 120, at § 8.5, 515; Ruder, Multiple
Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, in Par
Delicto, Indemnification and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597 (1972).
128. Compare Black & Co. v. Nova-Tech, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 468 (D. Oregon 1971),
with SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
129. 333 F. Supp. 468 (D. Oregon 1971).
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poses" for purposes of the Oregon jurisdictional statutes.13 0  In deny-
ing the firm's motion to quash service of process and dismiss the ac-
tion, the Oregon court opined:
It is not disputed that defendant. . . prepared the legal papers nec-
essary for Nova-Tech to complete the sale of its securities. Even if
[the lawyer] did not know and could not have known of Nova-Tech's
failure to register the securities, he was a participant in the sale be-
cause, without his assistance, the sale would not have been accom-
plished.13
1
Thus, the court effectively dispensed with any requirement that, as a
prerequisite to a finding of "active" participation, the attorney be
shown to have had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the
fraudulent 32 nature of the transaction in connection with which he
rendered legal advice or services. This rationale, if followed gener-
ally, would make every lawyer who prepares a registration statement,
or any documents -utilized in a supposedly exempt transaction, a proper
party defendant in a Rule 1Ob-5 lawsuit.
The Second Circuit has apparently adopted what would seem to be
a far more reasonable approach to the problem. In SEC v. Frank,
133
the SEC exhibited its intention to regulate the conduct of attorneys
involved in securities transactions by seeking an injunction against
the attorney there involved for violation of Section 10 and Rule
lOb-5 . 34  The attorney had assisted in preparing an allegedly mis-
leading offering circular in connection with an intrastate offering.
In his defense, he asserted that the misleading statements concerning
the company's products had been prepared by the corporate client
and that his "function had been [merely] that of a scrivener helping
to place [the client's ideas] in [sic] proper form.""13  On appeal of
the lower court's order granting a preliminary injunction, the court
stated that:
A lawyer has no privilege to assist in circulating a statement with
regard to securities which he knows to be false simply because his client
has furnished it to him. 30l
130. Id. at 472. Although this was an action under Rule 10b-5, it should be noted
that the court was here construing certain Oregon statutes. (ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 59.115
(3), 59.155).
131. 333 F. Supp. at 472, citing Adamson v. Lang, 236 Ore. 511, 516, 389 P.2d 39,
41-42 (1964) (emphasis added).
132. See note 126 supra.
133. 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
134. Id. at 487.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 489 (emphasis added).
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However, in reversing the grant of the preliminary injunction on pro-
cedural grounds, the court circumscribed the above pronouncement by
directing that, if the information was so expertised as to be beyond the
reasonable non-expert's ability to understand, then the defendant could
not be held liable for fraud merely because he included it in the offer-
ing circular. If, however, the information in the offering circular was
such that a non-expert could recognize its falsity, then the defendant
lawyer should be held to have been a direct participant in the fraudu-
lent practice of conveying misleading information. 13 7  In short, the
Second Circuit would apparently require a finding of knowledge, ac-
tual or constructive, as a prerequisite to a finding of "active" partici-
pation.
Even in jurisdictions in which knowledge is required as a prerequi-
site to a finding of active participation, it is likely that in order to
qualify for the lack of knowledge defense, the attorney will be re-
quired to have made some effort to ascertain the veracity of at least
easily verifiable statements and matters which were to be included in
the documents associated with the securities transaction for which his
services were utilized. An indication of this may be gleaned from the
recent case of Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.88 Although
that case was not a 10b-5 action but rather an action brought for
violation of Section 11 of the 1933 Act,'3 9 the court's expression of its
sentiments to the effect that an attorney would be required to show
greater efforts to establish the statutory defense of due diligence is of
particular importance to the present discussion. Significantly, the Bar-
Chris court stated:
It is claimed that a lawyer is entitled to rely on the statements of his
client and that to require him to verify their accuracy would set an un-
reasonably high standard. This is too broad a generalization. It is
all a matter of degree. To require an audit would obviously be un-
reasonable. On the other hand, to require a check of matters easily
verifiable is not unreasonable. Even honest clients can make mis-
takes. The statute imposes liability for untrue statements regardless
of whether they are unintentionally untrue. The way to prevent mis-
137. Id. "[A] lawyer [cannot] escape liability for fraud by closing his eyes to
what he saw and could readily understand."
138. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In BarChris the company's attorney was
held liable for a violation of Section 11 of the 1933 Act. However, it should be noted
that the attorney was also a director and thus his position as a person liable was deter-
mined by the statute itself.
139. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (1970).
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takes is to test oral information by examining the original written
record.1
40
In discussing the specific conduct of Mr. Birnbaum, house counsel for
BarChris, the court went on to state:
As a lawyer, he should have known his obligations under the stat-
ute. He should have known that he was required to make a reasona-
ble investigation of the truth of all the statements in the unexpertised
portion of the document which he signed. Having failed to make
such an investigation, he did not have reasonable ground to believe
that all these statements were true. Birnbaum has not established his
due diligence defenses.141
Thus, at least one court has expressly recognized that an attorney ren-
dering advice or services in connection with a securities transaction
may have a responsibility beyond that of a mere scrivener.
The analysis employed by the BarChris court with respect to the
question of due diligence would be equally applicable to the question
of knowledge on the part of attorneys rendering services in situations
involving potential lb-5 liability.142  The attorney who participates in
the preparation of an offering circular or prospectus should be deemed
to owe certain duties to the public with regard to the accuracy and
completeness of the material contained in such documents. Even as-
suming that the courts would not find active participation on the part
of an attorney in the rare situation in which his sole function is that of a
mere scrivener, the average legal practioner should take little comfort
in the likelihood .that the question of "active" participation is to be re-
solved, if at all, as a matter of degree. Although the existence and
extent of a duty owed the prospective offerees would be dependent upon
(1) the degree of participation by the lawyer in other than so-called
"lawyer tasks;" (2) the degree of his non-attorney involvement with
the issuer; and (3) the materiality and type of misrepresentations or
omissions alleged, it is not -unusual for an attorney rendering his ser-
vices in connection with a securities transaction to be involved beyond
the scrivener level-usually because the clients are totally unfamiliar
with what is involved in financing through either a private or public
140. 283 F. Supp. 643, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
141. Id. at 687.
142. See SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968), wherein Judge Friendly,
citing § 11 of the 1933 Act, suggested that in situations involving potential lOb-5 lia-
bility the lawyer may have an affirmative duty to investigate when put on notice.
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offering. This is true to an even greater extent in those situations in
which no underwriter is involved and the company is having its first
public issue. Further, in many cases, the company's house counsel
may be substantially involved in the business aspects of an offering.
Such involvement, while not necessarily unusual in security transac-
tions, may be sufficient to place the lawyer in the position of an "ac-
tive" participant. Thus, while no direct authority exists for the propo-
sition that shareholders damaged by Rule lOb-5 violations can recover
directly from the attorney involved, absent facts which make the at-
torney an "active" participant, it appears that the courts will take a
rather broad view of what may constitute such "active" participation.
Considering the hypothetical situation in terms of the attorney's
potential Rule IOb-5 liability, an interesting dilemma arises regarding ex-
actly what should be disclosed to the various groups of securities pur-
chasers. Ostensibly, the attorney is not a direct participant in any
palpably fraudulent scheme or practice. The lawyer has, however,
knowingly assisted his corporate client in acquiring capital while cir-
cumventing the requirements of registration under the 1933 Act by
reliance on the restrictive exemptive provisions. Obviously, the attor-
ney realized that the offerings made pursuant to Sections 4(2) and
3(a)(l1) would result in the acquisition of substantial amounts of
capital within a very brief period. Undoubtedly, the security pur-
chasers will be made aware of the exemption under which their par-
ticular security is exempted from the registration requirements. How-
ever, it is doubtful, especially for those who purchased pursuant to the
private placement, that they will be informed of the other supposedly
exempt offering and sale. Further, when considering the intrastate
offering, the attorney certainly should have recognized and disclosed
the potential integration of offerings problem, which would pose a con-
tinuing threat to the validity of either or both of the issuances sought
and accomplished, as well as to the financial stability of the corpora-
tion. It is likely that the various groups of purchasers would have
been deterred from their investment had they been aware of this possi-
ble corporate liability and its attendant consequences. Instead, they
were left uninformed at the time of their purchases, and were in fact
assured that the corporation was legally acquiring capital for its ex-
pansion. Obviously, there is a need to protect investors from such
practices, whether designed or inadvertent, and it is not reasonable to
exculpate the attorney who is usually an indispensable factor in deter-
mining the method used by the issuer in distributing its securities.
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INSURANCE
In view of the above discussed potential liabilities faced by attorneys
rendering advice and services in connection with the issuance of securi-
ties, it seems appropriate to include at least a brief discussion of the
question of insurance with respect to such liabilities. With respect to
coverage in regard to any attorney liability arising out of an action
based -upon legal malpractice, it seems clear that such liability would
be covered by the attorney's professional liability insurance. However,
coverage is not so clear with respect to any liability arising out of a
Rule 10b-5 action. This stems from the fact that many professional
liability policies, while ostensibly covering securities work, contain spe-
cific exclusions for "dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious acts
or omissions.' 1 43  Further, many such policies contain exclusions re-
garding situations wherein the lawyer is merely involved in a business
transaction rather than the practice of law.14 4  Since Section 10b and
Rule lOb-5 are securities fraud provisions, the questions arise as to
whether any liability arising under Rule 10b-5 is covered by the law-
yer's policy and whether he is entitled to be defended by his insurer.
In a recent New York supreme court case, St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. v. Cldrence-Rainess & Co., 45 it was held that an ac-
countant's insurer was required to defend the insured against a Rule
10b-5 action, even though the policy contained exclusions for fraudu-
lent practices. The court recognized three separate Section 10b and
Rule lOb-5 claims against the accountant: the common law doctrine
of fraud, misstatements of material facts (which may or may not have
been made in good faith), and the omission to state facts necessary to
make such omission not misleading. The court concluded that lia-
bility predicated on the first claim of common law fraud would fall
within the policy exclusion. However, the court asserted that -the in.-
surer's obligation to indemnify the insured against losses resulting from
adverse judgments on the second and third claims would depend on
the facts adduced at trial. Accordingly, the court directed the insurer
to defend, and stated that "it was unnecessary that every claim en-
143. The language most commonly found in lawyers' professional liability policies is:
This policy does not apply: (a) to any dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or
malicious act or omission of the insured, any partner or employee; (b) to the con-
duct or any business enterprise owned by the insured or in which the insured is a
partner, or which is controlled, operated or managed by the insured, either in-
dividually or in a fiduciary capacity, including the ownership maintenance or use
of any property in connection therewith; ....
144. See note 143 supra.
145. 335 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1972).
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compassed by the complaint be within the ambit of the protection
purchased. '146  If the trial court were to make specific findings that
the attorney was guilty of actual, willful fraud, it seems probable that
he would be without insurance coverage. 147  On the other hand, where
the decision of the court is either silent on the basis for the imposition
of liability or specifically finds negligent misrepresentation or omis-
sion, it would seem that a good case can be made for insurance cov-
erage under most of today's professional liability policies.
It is most unlikely that the draftsmen of most lawyers' professional
liability policies even considered the potential coverage problem pre-
sented by the fraud exclusion provision. Prior to the 1968 case of
Escott v. BarChris Construction Co., 48 there existed no reported cases
holding an attorney liable for "securities fraud" arising out of negligent
misrepresentations or omissions in the various documents associated
with a securities transaction. Even in BarChris, it is by no means
clear that the attorney involved would have been held liable absent his
status as a director of the issuer. Common law fraud and securities
fraud are not the same, although common law fraud is included within
the ambit of securities fraud.'49 With the advent of the possibility
that attorneys may be held liable for "securities fraud" arising out of
negligent misrepresentations or omissions, the meaning of the term
"fraud" as used in the exclusion provisions of the typical professional
liability policy has become ambiguous. In cases in which the mean-
ing of language in insurance policies is unclear, the law is well settled
that such questions should be resolved against the insurer:
In interpreting an insurance policy we apply the general principle that
doubts as to meaning must be resolved against the insurer and that any
exception to the performance of the basic underlying obligation must
be so stated as clearly to apprise the insured of its effect.150
146. Id. at 173.
147. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 9 Cal. App. 3d
508, 88 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1970); Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Hunefeld,
230 Cal. App. 2d 31, 40 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1964); cf. Fullerton v. Houston Fire & Cas.
Ins. Co., 234 Cal. App. 2d 743, 44 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1965).
148. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See text accompanying notes 138-41 supra.
149. See text accompanying notes 103-13 supra.
150. Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 269, 419 P.2d 168, 171, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 104, 107 (1966). See also, Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 65 Cal. 2d 100,
416 P.2d 801, 52 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1966); Continental Cas. Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co.,
46 Cal. 2d 423, 296 P.2d 801 (1956); State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 9 Cal. App. 3d 508, 88 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1970); Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co. v. Chasson, 277 Cal. App. 2d 801, 24 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1962); Neal v. State Farm
Ins. Co., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1961); Note, The Insurer's
Duty to Defend Made Absolute: Gray v. Zurich, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1328 (1967).
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Thus, with respect to whether the term "fraud," as used in the exclu-
sion provisions of the typical professional liability policy, excludes
from coverage liability arising out of both common law and securities
fraud, it appears likely that the courts would resolve the doubts as to
meaning against the insurer and limit the term to the exclusion of com-
mon law fraud alone.
Analogizing to the St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. case,
a strong argument can be made that attorneys with the misfortune of
becoming defendants in a Rule lOb-5 lawsuit should be afforded the
same protection as was afforded to the accountants therein. Further,
most insurers today agree to provide defenses in questionable cases on
a reservation of rights basis, leaving the question of coverage for reso-
lution following the conclusion of the original action. Thus, as a
practical matter, it is likely that in lOb-5 actions the insurer will de-
fend although there remains uncertainty as to the precise effect which
the common law fraud-securities fraud distinction will have on in-
surance coverage.
CONCLUSION
It is conceded that the portion of this article dealing with legal mal-
practice vis-ii-vis securities law problems has been bottomed largely on
California decisions. This is primarily due to the fact that so many re-
cent appellate pronouncements on the subject have been made in that
jurisdiction. There is, however, no reason to suppose that other juris-
dictions will be unwilling to follow the California trend, particularly in
light of the growing national trend in securities cases to hold lawyers
answerable.
It is well-settled that an aggrieved client may sue a negligent attorney
for malpractice. As discussed earlier in this article, intended benefi-
ciaries of the attorney's services should also be permitted to maintain
such an action, either in tort or contract, 5 ' against the negligent attor-
ney. The California Supreme Court has provided some definite guide-
lines for determining who should constitute such an intended benefi-
ciary: (1) the attorney must have undertaken the performance of legal
services for the client;152 (2) the attorney must be negligent in per-
forming such services; 153 and (3) the possibility of injury to the third
151. See text accompanying notes 67-86 supra.
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persons must be foreseeable.154  Thus, in situations in which the at-
torney's malpractice causes loss to purchasers of securities issued pur-
suant to offerings ostensibly but not in fact exempt from the registra-
tion requirements of the 1933 Act, a strong argument can be made
that the attorney should be held liable to such injured purchasers.
Further, in cases in which the invalidity of the issuance and its at-
tendant consequences result in the financial failure of the issuer, the
same considerations as applied with respect to the shareholders could
be applied to the question of possible attorney liability to the creditors
of the issuer. While no cases have yet imposed a duty on the attorney
with respect to the creditors of the issuer, the creditors satisfy the
requisites of the current tests determinative of the existence of a duty'15
as well as the shareholders. Just as the shareholders stand to lose their
investment as a result of the attorney's negligence, the creditors stand
to lose the monies due them from the insolvent corporate client.
Assuming public policy compels imposition of a duty, the main im-
pediment to the maintenance of a creditor action against the attorney
would be the establishment of proximate cause. If the attorney's
negligence could be shown to be the proximate cause of the failure of
the corporate client, then the negligent practitioner may well find him-
self liable for far more than the mere value of the securities issued.
With respect to possible 10b-5 actions against the attorney arising
out of services rendered for the purpose of accomplishing an exempted
securities offering, it must be remembered that the SEC has only re-
cently instituted a major action against two large and prestigious law
firms seeking permanent injunctions against alleged Rule 10b-5 viola-
tions.' 56 While this was not an action for rescission or money damages,
the SEC has certainly made allegations which would be equally appli-
cable in a private lOb-5 action seeking either of those remedies.'57
Thus far, however, very few private 10b-5 actions have been tried to a
conclusion, many of the reported decisions being the result of pre-
liminary motions and appeals taken from interlocutory rulings. Perhaps
the enormous exposure of the litigants is in itself a deterrent to prolonged
trials and possible adverse final judgments.
154. Id.
155. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
156. SEC v. Nat'1 Student Marketing Corp., Civ. No. 225-72 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 3,
1972).
157. See complaint filed by SEC in SEC v. Nat'1 Student Marketing Corp., Civ. No.
225-72 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 3, 1972).
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To the lawyer against whom a judgment is entered, it makes little
difference whether the theory of recovery was contract, tort, or lia-
bility under Rule lOb-5, except insofar as his malpractice insurance
may be affected. However, the availability, or lack thereof, of in-
surance is not the answer to the problem of attorney liability. The
real solution lies in the exercise of greater diligence and professional
responsibility on the part of the attorney himself. Arguing that the
SEC's stand on the reponsibility of lawyers "'will put a severe strain on
the confidential attorney-client relationship"'-5 s begs the question and
ignores the very existence of the issues which have brought about the
growing tide of actions against lawyers. While the authors in no sense
agree that an attorney should be required to inform the SEC of clients
who are about to violate the law, 159 as the SEC seems to suggest, the
Code of Professional Responsibility seems to require that a lawyer faced
with such a situation advise the client of the consequences of the un-
lawful act, and if the client thereafter persists in following the unlawful
course of conduct, then the attorney should report the matter as non-
privileged material. 6 ' An alternative procedure for the lawyer might
158. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 15, 1972, at 18, col. 3.
159. Id. at col. 1.
160. ABA CANON OF PRoFEssIoNAL ETICS No. 37 relates to the confidences of a
client, and contains the following limitation:
The announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the
confidences which he [the lawyer] is bound to respect. He may properly make
such disclosures as may be necessary to prevent the act or protect those against
whom it is threatened.
This limitation is based on sound public policy forbidding an attorney to assist in
the commission of a crime or to permit the attorney-client relationship to conceal a
wrongdoing. ABA COMM. ON PRoFEssIoNAL ETmcs, OPINIoNs, No. 155 (1936).
The attorney is only bound to disclose such confidences when the facts in the attor-
ney's possession indicate beyond reasonable doubt that a crime will be committed.
ABA COMM. ON PROFEssIoNAL ETHICS, OPINIONs, No. 314 (1965).
But the lawyer also "owes entire devotion to the interests of the client, warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his rights . . .to the end that nothing be taken or be
withheld from him save by the rules of law, legally applied." ABA CANoN oF
PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 15. Thus a lawyer may freely urge such disclosures to the
SEC by his client which are most favorable to him as long as there is a reasonable basis
for those positions. ABA COMM. oN PROFESSIONAL ETHics, OPINIONS, No. 314
(1965). Since potential violations of the Securities Acts often involve highly complex
problems of statutory interpretation, -the lawyer. should be able to rely on the most
favorable interpretation for his client, notwithstanding that he personally harbors grave
doubts as to whether there was a violation.
The difficult question occurs where the client has ii fact misled, either by misstate-
ment or omission, but without the lawyer's knowledge or participation. In this situa-
tion, upon discovery of the misrepresentation, the lawyer must advise the client to
correct the misstatement. Id. If the client refuses, the lawyer may have a duty to
disclose if in fact a criminal violation- is being perpetrated. The circumstances of
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be to simultaneously advise the client of the unlawful nature of the
client's intended representations or omissions under the circumstances
of the particular transaction, and at the same time withdraw as coun-
sel, thereby terminating the attorney-client relationship. If the client
follows the attorney's advice, the problem is solved and the relation-
ship may be resumed, the client willing. If the client does not, he pro-
ceeds at his own risk and the attorney should be held blameless.
each case may vary so greatly that no general rule may be set forth.
In addition to the lawyer's own ethical considerations, the lawyer must also bear in
mind that the SEC, under its Rules of Practice (17 C.F.R. § 201 (1971)), reserves the
right to disbar from practice before it any lawyer whom the SEC decides, by its own
hearing, has engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct. 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.2(e)(1)(ii) (1971). Thus the onus is much greater on the attorney in what
would otherwise be arguable circumstances where the SEC has taken the position that
he has a duty to disclose to the SEC any potential violation.
